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WTO Members met for the Fifth Ministerial Conference at Cancún in September 
2003 to undertake a mid-term review of the Doha round of trade negotiations. 
Agriculture is a key element of these negotiations as mandated in the Declaration 
launching the Doha Round: 
 
“Building on the work carried out to date and without prejudging the outcome 
of the negotiations we commit ourselves to comprehensive negotiations aimed 
at:  substantial improvements in market access;  reductions of, with a view to 
phasing out, all forms of export subsidies;  and substantial reductions in trade-
distorting domestic support. We agree that special and differential treatment for 
developing countries shall be an integral part of all elements of the negotiations 
and shall be embodied in the Schedules of concessions and commitments and as 
appropriate in the rules and disciplines to be negotiated, so as to be 
operationally effective and to enable developing countries to effectively take 
account of their development needs, including food security and rural 
development. We take note of the non-trade concerns reflected in the 
negotiating proposals submitted by Members and confirm that non-trade 
concerns will be taken into account in the negotiations as provided for in the 
Agreement on Agriculture.” (WTO, 2001). 
 
The failure of the Cancún Ministerial to reach agreement on a framework text on 
negotiating modalities for the market access agenda and on the extent of new rule-
making left the agricultural negotiations, as with the other areas under negotiation, in 
suspension. A meeting of the WTO General Council on 15 December 2003 was 
unable to provide the necessary momentum to move towards a successful and timely 
conclusion of the negotiations. However, although there is little sign at the beginning 
of 2004 that countries are yet ready to re-engage in meaningful negotiations, it is too 
early to write off the Round as dead.  
 
Agriculture is one of the make-or-break issues in the Doha Round. Thus it is timely to 
review what progress was made, if any, in the discussions on agriculture in the run-up 
to Cancún and whether the shape of a final agreement can yet be discerned. This 
chapter addresses this question through an analysis of the successive drafts of the 
framework text on the modalities of the agricultural negotiations and a comparison of 
the positions of the major players in these negotiations.
1  Particular attention is paid to 
the position of the developing countries and the way their concerns have been 
addressed in successive drafts. The paper is upbeat about the prospects of reaching an 
agriculture agreement. It argues that the main constraint to a successful resumption 
and conclusion of the Doha Round lies in broader political calculations in areas other 
than agriculture, but that progress in agriculture could greatly assist in improving the 
overall prospects for success. 
 
                                                 
1 A similar exercise undertaken by the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 
only came to my attention after the completion of this chapter (ICSTD, 2003). See also the agricultural 
backgrounder regularly prepared by the WTO Secretariat and updated 1 March 2004 (WTO, 2004).   2
II. The Road to Cancún  
 
The first draft text on modalities was circulated to WTO Members by Stuart 
Harbinson, Chairman of the Special Session on Agriculture, on 12 February 2003. A 
mini-ministerial meeting in Tokyo later that month was the first opportunity for some 
of the WTO membership to comment on the paper. The proposal failed to get much 
support and, indeed, no country strongly supported the first draft. Members could not 
even agree on a term to describe the draft (whether as a starting point, reference or 
basis for the negotiations), eventually agreeing to call it a ‘catalyst’. Despite these 




A second mini-ministerial took place in Montreal on 28-30 July. Despite some limited 
signs of flexibility (for example, the EU increased its offer to cut trade-distorting 
support from 55% to 60%, while expressing its willingness to eliminate export 
subsidies and expand tariff rate quotas for an agreed list of products) the meeting 
failed to give a political momentum to the negotiations. Following that meeting, the 
US and the EU were asked to work together to break the deadlock.  
 
In August 2003, the EU and the US issued a joint framework suggesting some areas 
of agreement on how they thought progress could be made. Among other things, this 
text proposed a blended formula for tariff reductions, a special safeguard for 
developing countries to protect sensitive products and improved duty-free access for 
developing country exports. Many of the proposals from this paper were included in 
the framework text on agriculture contained in Annex A of the Draft Ministerial Text 
prepared by the WTO Secretariat and published on 31 August as the basis for 
discussion at the Cancún meeting (called the Castillo draft after the Chairman of the 
General Council) (WTO, 2003a).  
 
Developing countries felt that this text leant excessively in the direction of developed 
country interests and it sparked a series of counter-proposals. A group of (initially) 21 
developing countries, including Brazil, China, India and South Africa (now usually 
referred to as the G20 as its membership varied both during and after the Cancún 
meeting), put forward an alternative text
3, followed by the African and least 
developed countries, which proposed another (WTO, 2003b). Four African cotton-
producing countries pursued a Sectoral Initiative on Cotton demanding the removal of 
all cotton subsidies and financial compensation while the subsidies still existed.  
 
A revised framework text on agriculture was presented to the Conference by the 
Secretariat on 13 September (called the Derbez draft after the Mexican Foreign 
Minister who chaired the conference) (WTO, 2003c). Although the negotiations on 
this text broke down the following day because of incompatible positions on the 
Singapore issues
4, there was some optimism that a deal could be reached on 
                                                 
2 This is not surprising. A statistical analysis by the Danish Research Institute of Food Economics 
(2003) which measured the distance between the negotiating proposals of each country showed that the 
Harbinson draft, if it were considered as the negotiating proposal of a separate ‘country’, was located in 
the middle of all other major proposals.  
3 The G21 alternative text on agriculture can be found at www.icstd.org. 
4 The Singapore issues cover trade and investment, trade and competition policy, transparency in 
government procurement and measures to facilitate trade such as the simplification of customs   3
agriculture on the basis of this draft. The manner in which it addressed the concerns of 
the major participating groups is discussed in the following section of the paper. 
 
The Cancún conference was notable for the capacity of developing countries to 
organise around common positions. While the Uruguay Round negotiations on 
agriculture were largely a US-EU affair, and were concluded once these countries 
reached the Blair House agreement, the Doha Round negotiations are more a North-
South issue although with sub-plots within each of these groupings. Already at the 
Doha Conference a loose alignment of developing countries calling themselves 
‘Friends of the Development Box’ had been formed to promote acceptance of ideas for 
greater special and differential treatment for developing countries in the agriculture 
agreement. The G20 group was notable for bringing together countries which 
traditionally have held very divergent positions in the agricultural negotiations, 
particularly on the importance to be attached to the Development Box. While the G20 
grouped the developing country heavyweights, the least developed countries, African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) and African Union countries came together in a group 
which was designated (by others if not by themselves, since the group contains only 
61 WTO members, 2003) as the G90, led by Mauritius. This group, in addition to 
supporting the Development Box proposals, sought measures to address tariff peaks 
and escalation, the binding of preferential access to developed country markets, and a 
compensatory mechanism to compensate for the erosion of trade preferences due to 
tariff liberalisation. A final group of eventually 33 countries (dubbed the G33), led by 
Indonesia and the Philippines, formed the Alliance for Strategic Products and a 
Special Safeguard Mechanism, which emphasised the particular importance of 
strengthening measures to protect vulnerable farmers.  
 
Membership of these groups overlapped, and the fact that leading countries in each 
alliance are members of the Cairns Group of agricultural exporting countries is also 
significant. The Cairns Group, which had been dominated by Australia following a 
hard-line free trade stance focusing on improved market access and the removal of 
subsidies, played a much more subdued role in Cancún as its developing country 
members followed a more development-oriented path.  CAFOD remarks on the fact 
that agriculture was the focus of all these developing country groupings, highlighting 
its central importance for them and the essential distraction which the Singapore 
issues represented (CAFOD, 2003). 
 
The cotton initiative proposed by four West and Central African LDCs – Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali – became the symbolic issue at Cancún, just as access to 
medicines at the Doha Conference. The African countries requested an ‘early harvest’ 
decision in Cancún to phase out all cotton subsidies and domestic support measures 
by 2005, along with the payment of compensation to LDCs during the transition 
period. The US and the EU were opposed to a decision of this kind, which they 
viewed as setting a precedent for commitments on specific products, challenging the 
aggregate approach adopted for Amber Box trade-distorting subsidies in the AoA.
5  
 
                                                                                                                                            
procedures They are referred to as the Singapore issues because the Ministerial Declaration following 
the WTO Council meeting in Singapore in 1996 agreed to establish working groups to analyse them. 
5 The EU position has since become more supportive of the African countries’ position, see 
Commission (2003).   4
A further feature of the Cancún conference was the role played by civil society 
organisations. Development NGOs turned up in strength and acted as a counterweight 
to the farm lobby representatives in influencing national delegations. The EU 
Agricultural Commissioner went so far as to partly blame their influence on 
developing country delegations for the breakdown of the talks. While the comment 
was seen as somewhat patronising with respect to developing country governments 
(CAFOD, 2003), it provides a further illustration of the changed dynamics of the 
conference negotiations. 
 
III.  Analysis of the key issues 
 
This section of the paper traces how negotiating positions have been reflected in 
successive draft texts of the modalities, beginning with the Harbinson draft through 
the Castillo text at the outset of the Cancún conference and the Derbez text at the end 
of that conference. Areas of agreement as well as disagreement are highlighted in 
order to form a view on the degree of convergence which has been achieved in the 




The US proposal on market access was to use a harmonising formula (the Swiss 
formula
6) to reduce agricultural tariffs, ensuring that no individual tariff exceeds 25% 
after a five-year phase in period. Tariffs should be simplified to either ad valorem or 
specific, but not mixed. The EU, on the other hand, proposed to continue the Uruguay 
Round (UR) linear formula, reducing agricultural tariffs by 36% on average, with a 
cut of at least 15% per dutiable item.  
 
The Harbinson draft proposed a banded approach. Tariffs greater than 90% would be 
reduced by 60% on average, with a minimum cut of 45% per tariff line. Tariffs 
between 90 and 15% would be reduced by 50/30%, while tariffs lower than 15% 
would be reduced by 40/25%. Reductions would take place in equal instalments over 
five years. Developing countries would be given a ten year implementation period and 
lighter reduction commitments. Least developed countries would not be required to 
undertake reduction commitments but might be encouraged to do so on a voluntary 
basis, taking into account their development needs. Newly acceded countries (such as 
China), who often offered more ambitious tariff concessions than those required under 
the UR formula, would have the flexibility to defer the implementation period for new 
commitments by two years. The Harbinson formula was opposed both by the 
supporters of a Swiss formula approach (which would bring all tariffs down to a 
specific maximum level) and by those (such as the EU) which wanted to continue the 
flexibility to have smaller reductions for certain sensitive products.  
 
The joint EU-US framework proposal proposed a blended approach instead. Some 
proportion of tariff lines would be subject to a Swiss formula coefficient; some 
proportion would be subject to the UR formula of an average tariff cut subject to a 
minimum; and some proportion of tariff lines would be duty-free. Moreover, a 
maximum tariff level would be agreed; countries which wished to retain tariffs above 
                                                 
6 The Swiss formula is Tn = (amax * T0)/(amax + T0) where T0 is the original tariff, Tn is the new tariff and  
amax is the upper bound on all resulting tariffs. With amax = 50, an initial tariff of 40 per cent would be 
reduced to 22 per cent.   5
this level would be required to offer effective additional market access through a 
request/offer process, including increases in tariff rate quotas. 
 
The G20 group accepted this blended approach although – for the UR element of the 
formula – they proposed a simple uniform tariff cut (instead of an average reduction 
subject to a minimum). However, for developing countries, they proposed the 
continuation of the UR formula across-the-board. They also called for an overall 
target for average tariff reductions by developed countries. Similar demands were 
included in the G90 proposal. 
 
The Castillo draft retained the blended formula approach based on the EU-US 
framework proposal, while adding the proviso that the resulting simple average tariff 
reduction for all agricultural products should be no less than a specified minimum as 
called for by the G20. It proposed to treat maximum tariffs as in the EU-US 
framework proposal, although the Derbez text offered a slight loophole that additional 
flexibility would be possible for a limited number of products on the basis of non-
trade concerns. From the G20 perspective, an objectionable element of this text was 
that it retained the use of the Swiss formula also for developing countries, implying a 
maximum tariff level for at least some products. 
 
Harbinson recognised the need for special and differential treatment for developing 
countries by proposing lower tariff reductions and longer implementation periods. 
However, both the Castillo and Derbez texts proposed that setting maximum tariffs 
also for developing countries should remain under negotiation, a proposal rejected by 
the developing countries. Reflecting the demand for a Development Box, Harbinson 
introduced the concept of ‘Special Products’ (SPs) which would be defined with 
respect to food security, rural development and/or livelihood security concerns. 
Harbinson suggested that the tariff reductions to be sought on SPs should be limited to 
an average of 10% (with a minimum reduction of 5%). The Castillo draft proposed a 
less attractive formulation from a developing country perspective, namely, a lower 
minimum reduction for SPs within the proportion of tariff lines which would be 
subject to the UR linear formula. Presumably, this would require compensating higher 
reductions on other tariff lines in order to achieve the overall targeted average 
reduction. The Castillo draft also proposed exempting SPs from any obligation to 
increase Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs). The Derbez text added that, where existing tariff 
bindings were very low, no further reductions would be sought. Development Box 
proponents see these as very weak provisions to secure the protection they believe to 
be necessary for these particularly sensitive products. 
 
An important element of the market access proposals in the Harbinson draft proposals 
was a clear formula to address tariff escalation issues. Where the tariff on a processed 
products was higher than the tariff for the product in its primary form, the rate of tariff 
reduction for the processed product would be equivalent to that for the product in its 
primary form multiplied by, at a minimum, a factor of 1.3. The EU-US framework 
text did not address this issue, and in the Castillo draft, it was reduced to ‘best 
endeavour’ language, stating that “the issue of tariff escalation will be effectively 
addressed.”  The G20 draft proposed retaining the Harbinson formula, and it was 
reinstated in the Derbez text. 
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The Harbinson draft proposed the elimination of the current special safeguard 
mechanism (SSG) which allows countries to levy an additional, time-limited import 
surcharge to protect domestic producers from a sudden surge in imports of certain 
products. This mechanism is only available to products which underwent tariffication 
in the UR and where countries had reserved the right to use it in their schedules. In the 
EU-US framework text, the use of the SSG was left as a matter for further negotiation 
and this language was retained in the Castillo and Derbez texts. The G20 draft calls 
for the conditions and timetable for its elimination to be negotiated. 
 
The Harbinson modalities also included provision for a new Special Safeguard 
Mechanism (SSM) to be added to the modalities to enable developing countries to 
effectively take account of their development needs. The SSM is strongly supported 
by both the G20, the G90 and the G33 “subject to conditions and for products to be 
determined”. The EU-US framework draft also accepted a SSM but linked it to the 
notion of “import-sensitive products” which would also benefit from lower tariff 
reduction commitments. Both the Castillo and Derbez texts contained a proposal to 
establish a SSM along the lines of the G20 proposal. Other developing countries in the 
G33, however, want the SSM to be available for all products, as well as ensuring that 
SPs would also have access to the SSM. 
 
On TRQs, the Harbinson text proposed that quota amounts would be increased up to 
10% of current domestic consumption of each product, as well as calling for 
simplification and greater transparency in the administration of tariff rate quotas. It 
did not propose a reduction of in-quota tariffs, except for tropical products or products 
which might substitute for crops which were illegal or harmful to human health, or 
where fill rates over a recent period had been particularly low. The EU-US proposal 
did not address this issue, although it implied that TRQs would be increased in cases 
where countries made use of the flexibilities under the tariff reduction formula to 
maintain particularly high tariffs or to implement minimum reductions for import-
sensitive products. Taking its cue from this draft, the Castillo and Derbez texts 
proposed a reduction of in-quota tariffs while leaving the terms and conditions of 
further TRQ expansion under negotiation. The G20 text supports the Harbinson draft 
in calling for an expansion of TRQs, while the G90 text contents itself with a call for 
simplification and greater transparency of TRQ regimes. 
 
The erosion of trade preferences following from any reduction in agricultural tariffs in 
developed countries has emerged as an important issue for a number of developing 
countries. The Harbinson draft modalities called for the maintenance of the nominal 
margins of tariff preferences where technically feasible – this is obviously not 
possible in cases where duty-free access is already granted. It proposed a longer 
implementation period and a two year moratorium for “tariff reductions affecting 
long-standing preferences in respect of products which are of vital export importance 
for developing country beneficiaries..” How this would work in practice is not clear, 
as eligible products are defined as those which account for at least 20% of the total 
merchandise exports of any beneficiary. This would seem to open up a potentially 
large number of products for which this special exception would apply. The 
formulation is supported in both the Castillo and Derbez texts, as well as in the 
proposals from the G20. The G90, in addition, seek the development of a 
compensatory mechanism to address the erosion of preferences for countries 
adversely affected.   7
 
The EU-US framework text addressed this issue by calling for duty-free access for a 
certain percentage of developing country imports to be provided “through a 
combination of Most Favoured Nation and preferential access”.
7  This formulation 
was carried into the Castillo and Derbez texts, although using the ‘best endeavour’ 
language that all developed countries “will seek to provide” this minimum amount of 
duty-free access. The G20 text strengthens this to the mandatory “shall provide”, with 
the implication that, where provided through preferential schemes, this access would 
be bound in the schedules of commitments entered by developed countries. The 
Harbinson draft modalities, in addition, had offered that developed countries either 
“should” or (much stronger) “shall” provide duty- and quota-free access to their 
markets for all agricultural imports from the least developed countries. This was 
weakened to ‘best endeavour’ language in the Castillo text that the objective of duty- 
and quota-free access for least developed countries “shall be expeditiously pursued”. 
Both the G20 and the G90 sought the stronger Harbinson alternative and, in the 




As was evident already in negotiating the Doha mandate in November 2001, the 
future of export subsidies is a hotly contested issue. The US, Cairns Group and 
developing countries have called for their elimination. The EU is the single largest 
user of export subsidies, accounting for around 85% of the total by value notified to 
the WTO Committee on Agriculture. It had originally proposed a 45% reduction in 
expenditure on average, provided that all forms of export subsidies, including export 
credits and the activities of state trading exporters, were treated equally.  
 
The Harbinson draft proposed that export subsidies for products accounting for 50% 
of export subsidy expenditure would be phased out over five years, while the 
remainder would be phased out over nine years, with the greatest reductions occurring 
in the earlier years. Developing countries would be given 10 and 12 years 
respectively. In the EU-US framework text, the EU offered to eliminate export 
subsidies on certain products of particular interest to developing countries (to be 
determined) while subsidies for the remaining products would only be reduced.  
 
The Harbinson text had also proposed to discipline export credits. Non-conforming 
export financing subsidies would be subject to reduction commitments, with 
exceptions for emergency situations in importing Members. The EU-US framework 
text proposed that parallel disciplines should be applied to export credits, state trading 
export enterprises and food aid programmes. It also added that, without prejudging the 
outcome of the negotiations, reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of 
export subsidies including export credits would occur in a parallel manner. 
 
The Castillo text combined these elements by affirming that reduction commitments 
shall be applied in a parallel manner to export subsidies, export credits, export state 
trading enterprises and food aid. It retained the commitment to phase out export 
subsidies for products of interest to developing countries, but added that, for the 
                                                 
7 In its original negotiating proposal to the Special Session, the EU proposed zero duty access for 50% 
of total imports of agricultural products from developing countries, as well as unrestricted access for 
imports from the least developed countries.   8
remaining products, “Members shall commit to reduce, with a view to phasing out, 
budgetary and quantity allowances for export subsidies”.  The G20 draft proposed 
adding a definite time horizon to this last commitment, turning it from a ‘best 
endeavour’ to a mandated commitment, but the Derbez draft retained the Castillo 
wording. However, the Castillo draft contained a commitment (para. 3.6) that “the 
question of the end date for phasing out all forms of export subsidies remains under 
negotiation”. This was further strengthened in the Derbez draft to become “An end 
date for phasing out all forms of export subsidies remains under negotiation”, thus 




While high-support countries are broadly satisfied with the Green Box as defined in 
the URAA, intended to permit countries to continue support programmes to 
agriculture which are deemed to be not or minimally trade-distorting, agricultural 
exporters and developing countries have sought to limit Green Box payments, arguing 
that their sheer volume has a distorting effect on global trade. The Harbinson draft 
modalities did propose some minor tightening of the criteria for eligibility for the 
Green Box in Annex 2 of the URAA but did not propose a cap on Green Box 
spending or remove any income support payments from the Green Box. At the same 
time, it responded to the demands from the EU, Switzerland and others to allow 
payments for animal welfare programme to be classified as a Green Box measure. 
 
The Castillo text simply noted that the Green Box criteria remain under negotiation. 
This was slightly strengthened in the Derbez draft to state that Green Box criteria 
shall be reviewed with a view to ensuring that Green Box measures have no, or at 
most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production. The G20 text altered 
this to propose that the Green Box disciplines should be strengthened with a view to 
ensuring that Green Box measures have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting 
effects or effects on production. 
 
Developing country interest also focused on Article 6.2 measures to encourage 
agricultural and rural development which are exempted from reduction commitments 
under this paragraph. The Harbinson draft modalities proposed extending the range of 
exempted measures and attached a list of possible amendments for further 
consideration. Surprisingly, this issue was not explicitly included in either the Castillo 
or Derbez texts nor in the G20 draft. 
 
With respect to trade-distorting (Amber Box) support, the Harbinson draft proposed 
that the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) should be decreased by 60% in 
five years for developed countries, and 40% in ten years for developing country 
members. The EU-US draft did not contain numbers for the extent of the reduction in 
trade-distorting support, but it did state that the reductions would be “significantly 
larger than in the Uruguay Round” (namely, 20% for developed countries). It also 
stated that Members with higher levels of trade-distorting subsidies would have to 
make greater efforts than others. The unspecified AMS reduction was carried into the 
Castillo draft, but a significant addition in the Derbez text was the commitment that 
product-specific AMS shall be capped at their respective average levels during a base 
period to be agreed. The G20 proposed, in addition, that the product-specific ceilings 
might be reduced in further negotiations and that, for heavily exported products,   9
additional disciplines should be negotiated. The EU-US text also proposed a reduction 
in  de minimis limits which was repeated in both the Castillo and Derbez drafts, 
although developing countries would be exempt from this reduction. 
 
The Uruguay Round Agreement introduced the Blue Box category of production-
limited support. The Harbinson draft proposed to cap these payments at their 1991-
2001 level and reduce them by 50% over five years. Alternatively, it suggested that 
the Blue Box should be merged with the Amber Box. The US had initially proposed 
to scrap the Blue Box entirely, but the EU-US framework text proposed to cap Blue 
Box spending at 5% of the total value of agricultural production at the end of the 
implementation period. It also proposed to relax the criteria for Blue Box payments by 
no longer requiring production limiting or supply management programmes. Under 
this new design, the US could seek to exempt its countercyclical payments under the 
2002 Farm Act from its reduction commitments. The EU-US text also proposed a 
reduction in de minimis limits, as well as introducing a new ceiling where the sum of 
Amber Box, Blue Box and de minimis payments would be significantly reduced 
below the combined sum of these payments in 2004.  
 
This formulation was carried over into the Castillo draft (with the total value of 
agricultural production fixed at the level of the 2000-2002 period) with the cap to be 
achieved by a specified date and with the proviso that, following that date, such 
support would be subject to a further linear reduction for an additional period of years. 
The Derbez text added that there should be a specified cut in the first year of 
implementation in the total sum of support under the Amber Box, Blue Box and de 
minimis ceilings. The G20 draft sought stronger disciplines on Blue Box support, 
seeking to cap it at 2.5% of the value of production in the initial implementation phase 
and proposing that the subsequent linear cuts in Blue Box payments would continue 
“with a view to its phasing-out”.  
 
Evaluation of the state of play of the negotiations 
 
Despite the failure at Cancún, the positive movement in the negotiations on 
agriculture to date should be noted. With respect to market access issues, the tariff 
reductions on offer in the Derbez text are potentially larger than those agreed in the 
Uruguay Round.
8 There is the prospect that tariff peaks would be addressed. A clear 
formula is on offer to address tariff escalation. Moreover, the principle of special 
products and a special safeguard mechanism for developing countries has been 
accepted by the developed countries, there is the possibility of mandatory binding of 
duty- and quota-free access for the least developed countries and acceptance of 
minimum levels of duty-free access for products from developing countries.  
 
Compared to the Uruguay Round Agreement, there has also been significant progress 
in the area of export subsidies. An offer to phase out export subsidies on a list of 
products of interest to developing countries has been made, as well as a commitment 
to significantly reduce remaining export subsidies in parallel with disciplines on other 
forms of export competition. The Derbez text also appears to move forward from the 
                                                 
8 This partly depends on whether the reductions are compared in absolute or in proportionate terms. To 
achieve the same absolute reduction as the 36% reduction agreed in the UR would require a cut of 
36/64 or 56% in the remaining tariffs. Any percentage average reduction less than 56% would imply 
that the absolute cut in tariffs would be smaller than in the UR.   10
Doha mandate in requiring members to negotiate a final date for the end of all export 
subsidies, although the EU would still have difficulty in agreeing to this (CAFOD, 
2003). 
 
Finally, much larger reductions in trade-distorting support, including Amber Box and 
de minimis payments, are now on offer than in the Uruguay Round. Furthermore, a 
cap will be placed on Blue Box payments. Special and differential treatment would 
apply to developing countries, including lower reduction commitments for Amber 
Box support, longer implementation periods and enhanced provisions under Article 
6.2.  
 
Despite this evidence of convergence in positions, significant differences remain. In 
the market access negotiations, three conditions raised by the developed countries 
could still cause difficulties. First, the EU is adamant that, while developing countries 
should continue to receive special and preferential treatment, this should not imply a 
different set of rules, but different implementation periods and extent of commitments 
based on the same rules. The EU does not agree to the blended formula approach 
(including applying the Swiss formula to a certain percentage of tariff lines) for 
developed countries and the Uruguay Round approach alone for developing countries. 
A second potential stumbling block is the insistence of both the EU and the US, in 
their framework text, that the rules and disciplines for special and differential 
treatment should be adjusted for significant net-exporting developing countries. This 
idea of differentiation (‘graduation’) – which is also promoted by the EU and others 
across all areas of negotiation in the Doha Round – is very opposed by the developing 
countries. However, the EU has highlighted that much of the benefits of the Round lie 
in the potential for increased South-South trade which is currently restricted by high 
developing country tariffs. It is also proposing that the more advanced developing 
countries should commit to provide duty-free and quota-free access for the 
agricultural exports of the LDCs, partly as a way of compensating for the erosion of 
their preferential access to developed country markets. Third, the EU has made very 
little progress to date on its demands on non-trade concerns such as consumer 
protection, food safety, extension of Geographical Indications, the environment and 
animal welfare. The Harbinson text merely called for further consideration. The EU-
US framework text simply noted that these were issues of interest that were not yet 
agreed, and this language has been carried into the Castillo and Derbez drafts as well.  
 
From the developing country perspective, the blended formula approach to tariff 
reductions may not provide the sharp reductions in developed country tariffs they 
want to see. For example, a characteristic of the EU’s bound tariffs is the great 
variance in individual rates. Large numbers of tariff lines have zero or relatively low 
MFN duties, but for a small number of tariff lines MFN duties are very high. By 
putting the relatively low tariffs into the grouping subject to the Swiss formula and a 
maximum tariff while dealing with the high tariff items through the linear Uruguay 
Round formula subject to a minimum reduction for sensitive commodities, the EU 
could avoid making significant reductions in its highest tariff rates (although the EU-
US text did provide for expanded TRQ access where Members took advantage of the 
minimum rate reductions). Many developing countries, including India, also argue 
that the current proposals on Special Products would need to be strengthened 
considerably before they are acceptable. 
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The export subsidy area still has the potential to cause difficulties, particularly for the 
EU. However, it is my view that all those involved in EU agricultural policy now 
accept that export subsidies are an indefensible form of trade policy instrument;  the 
question is not whether they should be eliminated, but when. The key issue for the EU 
is the question of parallelism. If sufficiently watertight commitments can be given to 
equally discipline export credits, food aid and the activities of single desk exporters, 
the EU would find it very difficult to resist pressure to agree a date for their 
elimination, and the only issue would be the timeframe for this to happen. 
 
In the area of domestic support, the contentious areas which remain are whether Blue 
Box payments should be further reduced and whether Green Box criteria should be 
further strengthened. Developing countries argue that the sheer scale of these 
payments distorts trade and have called for the elimination of the Blue Box and 
reductions in Green Box support. The EU insists that all forms of support are not 
equally trade distorting and that this distinction must be maintained. It is concerned 
that its recent efforts in the Mid-Term Review of the Agenda 2000 CAP reforms to 
shift spending from Blue Box to Green Box (decoupled) payments should not be 
undermined. It does not want to see the Blue Box ceiling further reduced or phased-
out in the future, and it is concerned that the Green Box criteria should remain 
sufficiently flexible to allow continued support to EU farmers to enhance 
environmental, food quality or safety and animal welfare objectives. With sufficient 
movement on market access and export subsidies, it is unlikely that these differences 
on domestic support would prove a stumbling block to an ultimate agreement. 
 
Through the smokescreens of individual countries’ negotiating positions, the broad 
outlines of the deal are clear. Developed countries will commit to significant 
reductions in tariffs and trade-distorting domestic support payments and the 
elimination of export subsidies, in return for a commitment by the developing 
countries to accept some lowering of their bound tariffs, subject to a deal on Special 
Products where lesser commitments would apply, while least developed countries 
would be exempt from reduction commitments. The fact that, for most developing 
countries, bound tariffs are well in excess of applied tariffs so that this discipline will 
not have any immediate impact, will make it easier to accept. Various side-payments 
would need to be made to ensure the agreement of key players, e.g. addressing the 
EU’s concern over GIs, developing countries’ concerns over special safeguards and 
the concern of preference recipients over preference erosion. However, these would 
not alter the basic parameters of potentially a very far-reaching and worthwhile 
agreement, also from the point of view of developing countries. 
 
IV.  After Cancún 
 
The regionalism option 
 
Following the Cancún talks breakdown, US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick 
famously attributed the breakdown to a divide between the "can do" and "won't do" 
countries. "The rhetoric of 'won't do' overwhelmed the concerted efforts of the 'can 
do.'" he said. He subsequently developed this theme in a Financial Times article in 
which he suggested that the US would place more effort in trying to secure its trade 
objectives through bilateral or regional deals with the “can do” countries if the 
multilateral process remained bogged down (Financial Times 22 September 2003).    12
 
The US is currently negotiating free trade area agreements with Morocco, Australia 
and the Central America Free Trade Agreement but these are hardly significant in 
global terms. As Lamy gleefully pointed out in a Washington speech in early 
November, “I am not going to lose any sleep about Bob Zoellick pursuing an FTA 
with Morocco, where the US starts from a tiny percentage of Morocco’s total trade… 
And did you know how many FTAs the US has?  Six, including counting NAFTA as 
two. The EU.. has got a fair few more than that…” (Lamy, 2003). A number of Latin 
American countries, including Columbia and Peru, have since left the G20 group in 
order to be able to pursue bilateral agreements with the US, but the big prize for the 
latter is the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) that would give it greater access 
to markets in the Western Hemisphere. However, the US, backed by Canada, has 
insisted that it will only negotiate concessions on agricultural subsidies (and anti-
dumping rules) – both key concerns of Latin American countries – in the Doha Round 
and not in the FTAA (Financial Times 24 September 2003.)  On the other hand, US 
demands that the talks should cover issues such as rules on services, investment, 
government procurement and intellectual property have been resisted by Brazil. Both 
sides appeared to set a fairly low threshold for success at their ministerial conference 
in Miami in mid-November (Financial Times 15 November 2003). 
 
For the EU, with its extensive network of regional arrangements, using the threat of 
regionalism to try to make progress on its multilateral agenda is less convincing. 
However, it continues to extend this network (for example, most recently with 
Mexico) and has also been pursuing talks with Mercosur. Lamy has argued that, if the 
multilateral process fails, the EU would look again at pursuing the bilateral option 
more actively but he does not see this as undermining the multilateral approach. “For 
the foreseeable future, we in Europe, you in the US and, increasingly, they in Asia, 
are going to pursue a mix of multilateral and bilateral trade agreements. I think this is 
healthy” (Lamy, 2003). The Achilles heel of any attempt by the EU to wield the 
regionalism stick is, again, its reluctance to grant sufficient agricultural concessions to 
its negotiating partners to make such deals attractive. Regionalism will not prove an 
attractive option to the major developing countries as an alternative to reviving 
multilateral negotiations. It would seem strangely ironic if these countries were 
individually to accept in bilateral deals what they have collectively rejected in the 
multilateral process.  
 
Significance of the peace clause 
 
A more attractive option for developing countries to pursue their objectives would be 
to use their existing rights under the WTO Agreements to attack developed country 
agricultural subsidies. Currently, Article 13 of the AoA, known as the ‘Peace Clause’ 
puts some restraints on the exercise of the normal rights which WTO Members have 
to react against the unfair effects of other countries’ subsidies. Under Articles XVI 
and VI of GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
two types of remedies are available against subsidies: 
•  imposition of countervailing duties, if there is material injury or the threat of 
material injury to domestic production resulting from these subsidies; 
•  making use of the dispute settlement mechanism against the subsidising 
Member if, as a result of the subsidy, there is either serious prejudice to the 
domestic industry, material injury or threat of injury to the domestic industry,   13
or nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to that Member even where 
the behaviour of the subsidising Member does not infringe a GATT provision 
(these latter are called non-violation complaints). 
 
The Peace Clause limits the right of countries to impose countervailing duties or 
initiate dispute settlement proceedings. In the case of domestic subsidies, a distinction 
is drawn between Green Box and trade-distorting subsidies. Green Box subsidies are 
exempted from countervailing duty action and the dispute settlement process. In the 
case of trade-distorting subsidies, due restraint should be shown in initiating 
countervailing duty investigations, the dispute settlement process cannot be activated 
provided that the measures do not grant support to a commodity in excess of the level 
during the 1992 marketing year and the measures are also exempted from non-
violation complaints. Conforming export subsidies have the protection that due 
restraint should be shown in initiating countervailing duty investigations, and action 
through the dispute settlement process cannot be taken. 
 
These provisions are valid for the “implementation period” which is defined in Article 
1(f) of the AoA as the nine-year period commencing in 1995. Thus the Peace Clause 
protections are set to expire on 1 January 2004.
9  The implications of this expiry is 
that countries aggrieved by, for example, the EU’s use of export subsidies or the US 
use of domestic subsidies could challenge these in the dispute mechanism process. 
Developing countries and other agricultural exporters, if frustrated by the apparently 
slow progress in liberalising farm trade through negotiation, will be tempted to seek 
more rapid progress towards this objective through the dispute resolution mechanism. 
For example, Australia, Brazil and Thailand have already initiated cases against the 
EU and US on cotton and sugar. They may indeed be successful in this objective, 
although there is a serious risk that the ensuing series of trade disputes would lead to a 
further poisoning of the world trade climate.
10   
 
Countries, such as the EU, which have benefited from the Peace Clause will insist that 
its renewal is a precondition for continuing negotiations. The EU has warned that 
exporting countries face a mutually exclusive choice between achieving their 
objectives either through litigation or through multilateral negotiation. However, it 
appears to have no real leverage to secure its continuation, as it is hard to see what 
they might offer to developing countries, in particular, who have relatively few 
subsidies and thus have little interest in allowing an extension of the Clause. It hardly 
seems credible that the EU, having invested so much in the Doha Development 
Round, would be willing to walk away from further negotiations if it did not get its 
way on this issue, particularly as it would take at least two years before the 
consequences of any successful complaint against it would be felt.
11  However, even if 
there is no formal waiver or moratorium, there could be a tacit agreement to show 
restraint if there was clear evidence that the developed countries were prepared to 
                                                 
9 Some have tried to interpret the “beginning of the implementation period” as meaning the time when 
their implementation commitments began, which in the case of the EU would be 1 July rather than 1 
January. 
10 For a view on the prospects for bringing a successful challenge to agricultural subsidies under the 
GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Agriculture following the expiry of the Peace Clause, see Steinberg/ 
Josling, 2003.  
11 This includes the time for the consultations, panel hearing and report, appeal to the Appellate Body 
and the time allowed to a country to bring its laws and regulations into compliance.   14
move closer to developing country demands on agricultural issues (Bridges Vol. 7, 
No. 31, 25 September 2003). 
 
Moving towards Geneva 
 
The meeting of the WTO Council in Geneva on 15 December 2003 was mandated to 
take stock of the fallout from the failure of the Cancún meeting, and ‘to take the 
action necessary at that stage to enable us to move towards a successful and timely 
conclusion of the negotiations’ (WTO, 2003d). A number of countries, such as the 
APEC countries (including the US), and those of the G20 meeting in Buenos Aires in 
early October 2003, had indicated that they were willing to resume negotiations on the 
basis of the Derbez text (even though the latter roundly rejected this text at the 
Cancún meeting) (Financial Times 22 October 2003).
12  The EU reacted more 
cautiously, with Lamy expressing amazement at “the amazing race over the last week 
to endorse the text produced in Cancún on 14 September” (Lamy, 2003). Noting that 
many WTO members had attacked the document in Cancún, he said: "I am left to 
wonder, rather, what magic dust has been shaken over a text so roundly rejected in 
September, to find it so roundly endorsed in October” (Lamy, 2003). However, he also 
stated that he thought the Cancún text was a “pretty good effort even if it caused us 
some real grief on agriculture” (Lamy, 2003). Subsequently, it has been reported that 
the EU and the US are prepared to use the Derbez text as the basis for further 
discussions (Bridges Vol. 7, No. 34, 15 October 2003). 
 
While the outline of a potential deal on agriculture can be discerned, the way forward 
for the resumption of the Doha Round negotiations remains unclear. Removal of the 
roadblock caused by the Singapore issues (the EU, at least, has now indicated that it is 
prepared to adopt a more flexible approach on these issues, see Commission, 2003) 
would certainly facilitate progress in the agricultural negotiations. More broadly, the 
frustrations of the developing countries that their concerns, on implementation and on 
improving special and differential treatment provisions, have not been addressed in 
the period since Doha despite the promises on that occasion, will also need to be 
tackled (Chetaille/Tavernier, 2003). The cotton issue remains important in this regard. 
 
But there remains a sense that success might be elusive. Following the failure of the 
Seattle WTO Ministerial Council to launch a comprehensive round of trade 
negotiations, success at Doha in 2001 was achieved in part because of its proximity to 
the terrible events of 11 September that year and the desire of countries to 
demonstrate solidarity at that time. Business pressures in the major countries, and the 
pressures of exporting interests in particular, have appeared much more ambivalent 
about the importance of successfully concluding a new round than was the case in the 
Uruguay Round. With a more divided international climate in 2003 over policy 
towards Iraq, the necessary momentum behind the talks has been slow to build up. 
The US commitment to a successful round, which had never seemed wholehearted, 
has cooled markedly as the US has been put on the defensive over the 2002 Farm Bill 
and cotton subsidies. The escalating number of US-EU trade disputes (steel, FSC, 
hormones, GMOs, the US Bio-Terrorism and Buy American Acts, the new EU 
chemicals policy), the US Presidential election in 2004 and the replacement of 
                                                 
12 There is speculation that the apparent softening in the position of the G20 group may reflect the 
haemorrhaging of members since the Cancún meeting. Only 12 countries signed the political 
declaration at the end of the Buenos Aires meeting, see Bridges Vol. 7, No. 34, 15 October 2003.   15
Paschal Lamy as the chief negotiator on the EU side when the new Commission takes 
office next year also add to the general uncertainty. Progress on agriculture may 
depend on whether an improvement in the overall negotiating climate can be 
achieved, but there is no doubt that progress on agriculture would also help greatly to 
bring about that needed improvement. Negotiations on agriculture are set to resume in 
March 2004. Although some Members have expressed the view that sufficient 
progress may be made to permit at least an informal ministerial by year end, it seems 
more likely that meaningful negotiations will not resume until the next Ministerial 
meeting planned for Hong Kong in 2005. Such a delay, while regrettable, would draw 
parallels with the Uruguay Round experience. If a good agreement on agriculture is 
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